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Abstract
The idea of liquid democracy responds to a widely-felt
desire to make democracy more “fluid” and continuously
participatory. Its central premise is to enable users to em-
ploy networked technologies to control and delegate vot-
ing power, to approximate the ideal of direct democracy in
a scalable fashion that accounts for time and attention lim-
its. There are many potential definitions, meanings, and
ways to implement liquid democracy, however, and many
distinct purposes to which it might be deployed. This pa-
per develops and explores the “liquid” notion and what
it might mean for purposes of enhancing voter choice
by spreading voting power, improving proportional rep-
resentation systems, simplifying or aiding voters in their
choice, or scaling direct democracy through specializa-
tion. The goal of this paper is to disentangle and further
develop some of the many concepts and goals that liquid
democracy ideas often embody, to explore their justifica-
tion with respect to existing democratic traditions such as
transferable voting and political parties, and to explore
potential risks in liquid democracy systems and ways to
address them.
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1 Introduction
Democracy is in the midst of a credibility crisis. Some of
the most well-established Western democracies have be-
come increasingly polarized [65, 44] to the point of trib-
alism [39, 60] and authoritarianism [14]. The informa-
tion sources voters use to understand the world and make
their decisions is increasingly suspect [87, 26, 88, 13, 72].
While democracy preaches a gospel of treating all citizens
as equal, established democracies fail to protect the equal-
ity of citizens’ influence at the ballot box [75, 33, 17, 28,
46, 68, 78]. .
Outside the ballot booth, people in real democracies
depend on government to protect not only their physi-
cal safety, but also their economic and social equality and
human rights. Here too, established democracies fail to
protect their citizens from private coercion or feudal rent-
seeking structures [73]. They fail to ensure equal access
to equal economic opportunity by accelerating transfers
of public wealth to the already-rich in the face of sky-
rocketing economic inequality [49, 62], fail to offer an
adequate social safety net to protect the ability of the un-
lucky or disadvantaged to participate in society as equals
with dignity, and even fail event to protect many people
from effective slavery [85, 47]. As Robert Dahl asked: “In
a political system where nearly every adult may vote but
where knowledge, wealth, social position, access to offi-
cials, and other resources are unequally distributed, who
actually governs?” [20]
1.1 Can Technology Revolutionize the Pro-
cess of “Rule by the People”?
Today’s democratic processes and institutions were de-
signed around assumptions rooted in paper-based bureau-
cracy, that every interaction between people in which
government is concerned is costly both in human time
(people physically going to government offices and fill-
ing out forms) and economically (the costs of printing
paper forms and hiring white-collar bureaucrats to han-
dle them correctly). The main objective and optimiza-
tion constraint in government by in-person interaction and
paper-based bureaucracy is to minimize frequency of in-
teractions and to maximize what is accomplished by each.
Today’s increasingly-pervasive networked computing
technologies, however, may hold the potential to reduce
the cost of interactions by many orders of magnitude:
enough to enable a qualitative “phase change” in appli-
cable approaches to designing and building democratic in-
stitutions. When interactions between people or with gov-
ernments can happen anywhere, at any time, with a button
press or touch-screen gesture, requiring neither physical
presence nor paper form-filling, the feasible design space
changes completely, just as completely different processes
and technological tools are applicable when building a
stone wall versus filling a swimming pool with water.
1.2 Liquid Democracy: Essence, Origins,
and Analogies
This is the technology context in which liquid democracy
arose: stated vaguely and informally, the idea that tech-
nology could free democracy from the clunky constraints
of paper ballots and government bureaucracies, and en-
able voters to guide and direct their “power of the peo-
ple” more easly, flexibly, and fluidly, like the flow of a
liquid. The term has no precise or standard definition,
and even its origin is unclear. The specific term “liq-
uid democracy” seems to have made its first recorded ap-
pearance on a long-defunct wiki by a user going by the
handle “sayke” and now preserved only on the Internet
Archive [69, 70]. Most of the ideas associated with liq-
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uid democracy were suggested earlier in various forms,
however [24, 40, 79, 58, 54, 29].
Since there is no single clear, standardized definition
of what liquid democracy actually means, we will focus
here on what the term might reasonably mean, based on
the namesake analogy of physical liquid. As a physical
state of matter, liquid has two fundamental distinguishing
properties: it has no fixed shape but is able to flow (like a
any fluid including a gas), and it is largely incompressible
or volume-preserving (unlike a gas). Important prop-
erties derived from these fundamental characteristics in-
clude that liquids can be subdivided into nearly-arbitrary
fractional portions (treating their molecular limits as small
enough not to matter for most purposes), and they may be
stored and directed at low cost and effort (via containers,
channels, tubes, etc.).
As the purpose of any government is to manage the flow
and expression of power (whether political, economic, or
social), the term liquid democracy naturally suggests an
approach to democratic governance that manages expres-
sion and use of power like a “liquid”: i.e., a virtual sub-
stance whose flow people may direct or subdivide easily at
fine granularity and low cost. The liquid democracy con-
cept originally and most naturally applies to the nature of
voting and democratic choice, and that will be the focus
of this paper. The liquid analogy might also be applicable
to to other critical aspects of democratic governance, such
as ways voters obtain and vet information to make deci-
sions, and ways to protect equality in the social and eco-
nomic opportunities citizens need for effective participa-
tion. We leave the exploration of these more far-reaching
applications of the liquid analogy to further exploration
elsewhere, however.
In focusing on liquid democracy applied to democratic
choice, we will attempt to separate and analyze step-by-
step several of the entangled ideas of how liquid democ-
racy could make voting more “liquid.” We will attempt to
disentangle and explore in some detail the key ideas em-
bodied in many of the variants of liquid democracy. We
will end up with something close to the idea of delegative
democracy that Ford proposed in 2002 [29], but unpack-
ing the ideas it contains step-by-step and relating them to
relevant precedents in existing democratic practices. We
will explore, in particular:
• how the nearly-arbitrary subdivisibility of a liquid
applies to election systems that allow voters to split
and spread their voting power among multiple alter-
native choices or candidates (Section 2);
• how a liquid’s ability to flow may help us visualize
– and perhaps improve – election systems that try to
avoid “wasted votes” via vote transfer (Section 3);
• how the idea of guiding and directing a liquid’s flow
suggests both old and new mechanisms to simplify
voter choice by delegating democratic voting power
to parties, organizations, individuals, or even algo-
rithms (Section 4);
• how both subdividing and guiding liquid voting
power in combination suggests solutions to the lim-
its of voter attention and enlightened understanding
that current limit the scalability of direct democratic
participation (Section 5); and finally,
• how a liquid approach might make the timing of
deliberation and democratic choices more fluid and
give citizens more effective control over the demo-
cratic agenda (Section 6).
The purpose of this paper is not to analyze any of
these possible applications of the “liquid” analogy in great
depth, but rather to take a high-level perspective on how
they might be useful and potentially fit together.
Making innovative changes to decision structures, or
other elements of democratic governance processes, in-
herently present risks. We explore some of these risks
in cases where they are readily apparent, but make no
pretense at having exhaustively identified all such risks.
More detailed formal or experimental analysis of the ideas
of this paper remains for future work. Technology ul-
timately holds both great promise and great peril for
democracy; the purpose of this paper is to focus on the
former while acknowledging the latter.
2 Liquidity in Enriching Choice by
Spreading Vote Power
Even if the desired collective outcome of an election is a
single winner, this does not necessarily imply that each
voter’s input to the election must – or should – necessar-
ily be just one single choice, despite that being the most
common practice. A voter’s preferences may be more
nuanced. For example, a voter may prefer first-choice
candidate A, but be willing to live with less-desired al-
ternatives B or C, while truly despising candidate D. If
A has little chance of winning, then the voter must often
choose between expressing her true preference for A and
“wasting” her vote, or strategically trying to help more-
electable candidates B or C win over D. Similarly, if a
majority would prefer either centrist candidateB orC but
their support is split, then an extremist candidate A or D
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might win with a relatively small plurality of support de-
spite being least-desired by a majority of the electorate.
Recognizing these strategic conundrums, many elec-
tion systems have been devised that allow voters to ex-
press support for multiple candidates, in effect “spread-
ing” their voting power instead of lumping it into an all-
or-nothing choice. Since one of the basic properties of a
physical liquid is the ability to be subdivided arbitrarily,
viewing voting power or support as a liquid may be a use-
ful and interesting way to understand voting systems that
allow voters to split or spread their choice. This section
explores several existing vote-spreading schemes in this
light, using the liquid analogy to illustrate their operation.
2.1 Approval Voting: Vote Spreading at No
Cost
Approval voting asks voters not to make a single choice
but instead to make a yes-or-no “approval” decision on
each candidate individually. Voters effectively choose an
arbitrary subset of the candidates they consider “above the
bar” or meeting whatever threshold they set, without ex-
pressing any preference among those they approve. The
vote is tallied simply by adding the number of approvals
each candidate receives and choosing the candidate with
the highest approval score. If the voter prefers A but can
live with B or C, for example, then she can approve all
three in order to help any of them win againstD.
By allowing voters to support both a most-prefered
candidate together with at least one realistically-electable
candidate, approval voting allows voters to avoid “wast-
ing” their vote. Approval voting is also often seen as desir-
able because it tends to prefer “centrist” candidates, who
may have weak support from a majority, over “extremist”
candidates who have strong support of a minority but lit-
tle support in the rest of the electorate. Finally, approval
voting is attractive because it allows paper ballots to be
laid out exactly as with traditional single-choice ballots –
e.g., with a checkbox or oval next to each candidate – but
merely stating in the instructions that voters may choose
multiple candidates.
While approval voting is certainly simple enough that
we don’t “need” a liquid analogy to understand or explain
it, we nevertheless take it as a starting point for exploring
the applicability of the liquid analogy to vote-spreading
systems. As illustrated in Figure 1, we imagine each voter
to have a pitcher of “voting liquid,” which the voter uses
to fill (or leave empty) each of a set of fixed-size con-
tainers, one for each candidate. Each voter starts with
enough liquid to fill all candidates’ containers, if desired –
although that particular choice (b) is equivalent to casting
no vote or filling no containers, since it “helps” all candi-
dates equally and hence helps none relative to the others.
Thus, in practice each voter will have some unused liq-
uid left-over after approving a proper subset of the candi-
dates. The “tallying” process in this visualization simply
amounts to collecting all the liquid cast for each candidate
from the respective containers in all the voters’ ballots,
and comparing each candidate’s total amount of collected
liquid (f).
By giving each voter “enough” voting liquid to choose
any subset of candidates without affecting the amount of
liquid conferred to each one, approval voting effectively
allows voters to spread their vote with no cost or penalty
for choosing more candidates: i.e., it allows vote spread-
ing with no scarcity. In subsequent sections we will use
this liquid analogy to contrast this system with related ap-
proaches that do impose a cost on choosing more candi-
dates.
One critique of approval voting is that it requires vot-
ers to divide candidates into just two “bins” (approved or
unapproved), while offering no obvious principle for how
that arbitrary approval “bar” should be set. Further, vot-
ers have no way to express strength of preferences among
the subsets of candidates either above or below that bar.
Variations such as score voting and majority judgment
voting [8] address this issue by allowing voters to “grade”
candidates on a scale (e.g., A, B, C, D), at a cost of in-
creased complexity and less-familiar ballot structures. Fi-
nally, although there are adaptations of approval voting to
multi-winner elections [51, 12], they tend to be complex,
often difficult to tally even with computers [7], and in-
volve seemingly-arbitrary vote “re-weighting” functions.
2.2 Cumulative Voting: Vote Spreading
with Economic Scarcity
Consider now the long-established precedent of cumula-
tive voting, a technique still commonly used in corporate
governance processes such as board elections. Instead
of assigning only one vote to each voter (or to each vot-
ing share in a corporation), the voting authority typically
assigns some equal number V of votes per voter (or per
share). This approach enables voters not only to spread
their voting power among multiple candidates but also to
express relative preferences between them. Voters have a
choice not only of whom to vote for, but also of how much
(i.e., what percentage) of their total voting power to assign
each candidate. If a voter likes candidate A twice as much
as B, she can cast about two-thirds of her voting power to
A and one-third to Bob. Voters may still choose to assign
all their voting power to one candidate, a strategy known
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(a) Example of an empty ballot in its initial
state before the voter has allocated “voting
liquid” to any issues or candidates.
(b) Example of a hypothetical voter who ex-
presses no preference by supporting all the
available options. The net effect is the same
as an empty ballot.
(c) Example of a voter who clicks only one
up-arrow to approve only one option.
(d) Example of a voter who approves two of
five options.
(e) Example of a voter who approves all but
one option.
(f) Example “liquid tally” of the three example ballots (c), (d), (e)
above.
Figure 1: Liquid approval voting examples
as plumping. On the other hand, if a voter has 10 votes to
cast and likes two candidates about equally, she can cast
five votes for each of those two candidates.
A cumulative vote in essence acts like a specialized
ephemeral currency, in which each voter receives an equal
number of “coins” to “invest” in one or several candidates
as they see fit. Cumulative voting thus follows a conven-
tional economic scarcity principle: a coin (vote) spent on
one candidate cannot also be spent on another. Besides
enabling voters to express strength of preference, cumu-
lative voting is often seen as a way to protect minority
interests in multi-winner elections in which the top k can-
didates win seats, because a minority coalition holding
a 1/k fraction of total voting power can use a plump-
ing strategy to win at least one representative seat. Cu-
mulative voting does not solve the “wasted votes” issue,
however: a voter who casts even just one of several votes
or coins for a candidate with no realistic chance of being
elected reduces the voter’s ultimate influence over which
of the more viable candidates get elected.
While cumulative voting allows voters to express
strength of preference, it usually requires them to do so
at a fixed granularity set by the voting authority. Voters
must “calculate fractions” to translate their preferences
into a suitable number of votes to give each candidate.
The globally-determined number of votes per voter V
may not be evenly divisible by the fractions reflecting the
voter’s preferences, complicating the “mental arithmetic”
demanded of each voter. If a voter supports candidate A
twice as much as B, for example, and would thus like to
cast 2/3 to A and 1/3 to B, but the number of votes V
per voter is (say) 10, then the voter must round: e.g., to
7 votes for A and 3 for B. This rounding introduces error
in the voter’s expression of preferences (about 5% in this
example). We can reduce error by assigning more votes
per voter, of course: e.g., V = 100 allows the example
voter to assign 67 votes to A and 33 to B, reducing error
to 0.5%. This finer granularity clearly comes at a cost of
increased complexity in the mental arithmetic required of
voters, and likely increase of voter mistakes: it is much
easier for people to see immediately that several one-digit
numbers sum to 10 than to verify that several two-digit
numbers sum to 100.
Liquid Cumulative Voting: Here we encounter a situa-
tion in which viewing voting power as a liquid may lead to
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interesting improvements on existing voting practices. We
tend to think of a physical liquid as if it were arbitrarily
subdivisible in any desired fractions: although there is still
a minimum granularity (e.g., one atom or molecule), it is
small enough not to matter for practical purposes. People
intuitively divide liquids by arbitrary fractions or ratios in
everyday practices as ancient as cooking: mix two parts
water with one part vinegar, pour half into the pan. Could
the rich expression of voting preferences be made as sim-
ple and intuitive as handling liquids in cooking? While
voting using real liquid would no doubt get messy, could
an electronic voting system with a suitable user interface
allow users to visualize their voting power as a virtual liq-
uid, and divide and spread it among candidaters in what-
ever ratios make sense to them?
Figure 2 illustrates one way this might be accom-
plished. Each user is given an equal amount of virtual
voting liquid, which they can divide into any number of
equal “parts” for allocation to the candidates. Clicking
the up-arrow for a candidate adds one part to that candi-
date, decreasing the proportion of liquid represented by
each part. In Figure 2(b), for example, the voter has cre-
ated just one part, assigning all his virtual voting liquid to
option 3. In Figure 2(c), the voter has assigned two parts
to option 2 and one part to option 5, expressing support
for these two options, the former twice as much as the lat-
ter. Tallying the vote simply amounts to adding up all the
liquid portions from all voters according to candidate, as
illustrated in Figure 2(f).
Voters no longer need to translate their preferences into
coarse-grained units arbitrarily determined by the vot-
ing authority (e.g., 10 or 100 votes each). Instead, each
voter independently decides the number of parts to to di-
vide his voting liquid into, while fairness is preserved
by the fact that each voter gets the same amount of liq-
uid. In practice the electronic voting system may need to
reduce these voter-defined fractions at some point down
into some minimum-granularity unit for tallying, but this
granularity can be arbitrarily small to ensure high preci-
sion (e.g., “microvotes”), without users ever needing to
be aware of it.
While an electronic “liquid simulation” voting interface
like in Figure 2 might be a powerful and intuitive way to
allow users to subdivide their vote by parts, a similar ef-
fect could be approximated with conventional paper bal-
lots. Consider the example ballot in Figure 3, which looks
exactly like a conventional paper ballot except with sev-
eral fillable ovals next to each candidate instead of just
one. The ballot instructs voters to fill any number of
ovals next to whichever candidate or candidates they sup-
port. The voter’s total voting power is divided into equal
parts according to the total number of ovals filled, and
distributed to the candidates in those proportions. With
this approach, it remains trivial for voters to “plump” all
their voting power onto one candidate as in conventional
voting: simply fill in one oval (or all) next to the single
most-preferred candidate. But voters can also spread their
voting power by intuitive ratios, e.g., filling two ovals for
A and one for B, to express that they support both but
consider A twice as desirable.
2.3 Quadratic Voting: Vote Spreading with
Attenuated Cost
The recently-proposed idea of quadratic voting [64, 52]
ties voting to economic theory evenmore closely. Like cu-
mulative voting, quadratic voting assumes each voter has
a pool of voting “coins” or tokens: perhaps apportioned in
equal measure to each voter, in proportion to the amount
of stock held in a company, or even purchased directly for
real money, depending on the variation. Also like cumu-
lative voting, voters can express strength of preference by
spending all their voting tokens on one candidate or issue,
or spread it among multiple different candidates or issues.
In quadratic voting, however, the voter pays the square
of the number of votes cast for or against a given candidate
or issue: e.g., casting one vote costs one coin, but casting
two votes for the same candidate or issue costs four coins.
Thus, casting more votes for a given candidate or issue
costs not just more coins but progressivelymore coins per
vote. In a certain rational model of voting behavior, there
is an argument that quadratic voting incentivizes voters to
reveal their true strength of voting preferences, by being
willing to pay more per vote on candidates or issues they
care more about, and little or nothing on choices for which
they have weak or no preference.
In practice, many ordinary human voters are likely to be
unaware what “quadratic” even means, let alone under-
stand the sophisticated incentive-compatibility argument
behind it – or make the complex probabilistic strategy cal-
culations of the ideal rational voter it assumes. The liquid
voting power analogymight offer a way to make quadratic
voting slightly more intuitively comprehensible, however.
Liquid Quadratic Voting: Consider Figure 4, illustrat-
ing a liquid quadratic voting analog of the liquid cumula-
tive voting example above. As before, each voter is given
an equal amount of virtual voting liquid, which they may
divide into any number of parts and assign to candidates
or issues. However, in this case the “containers” they are
filling are not vertical beakers as above, but rather elas-
tic “water balloons” in two-dimensional space. Adding
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(a) Example of an empty ballot in its initial
state before the voter has allocated “voting
liquid” to any issues or candidates.
(b) Example of a hypothetical voter who ex-
presses no preference by allocating equal
voting liquid to each of the options. The net
effect is the same as an empty ballot.
(c) Example of a “plumping” voter who
clicks only one up-arrow to place all her vot-
ing power on one option, using all the voting
liquid in just one part.
(d) Example of a voter who supports two
of five options, one twice as strongly as the
other, dividing the liquid into three parts.
(e) Example of a voter who supports all but
one option, allocating the voting liquid in
equal parts among the other four options.
(f) Example “liquid tally” of the three example ballots (c), (d), (e)
above.
Figure 2: Liquid cumulative voting examples with “subdivision by parts” interface
more liquid to one candidate’s balloon expands its two-
dimensional area proportionately, but it is the balloon’s
height (circular diameter) that determines how much the
vote affects the corresponding option. As illustrated in
Figure 4(f), the resulting votes are tallied by “stacking”
the water balloons (in a perfect virtual world with no
squashing due to gravity) and measuring the total height
of each candidate’s stack.
Viewed in this way, quadratic voting represents an in-
teresting intermediate point between approval and cumu-
lative voting. Recall that approval voting imposes no cost
to the voter for approving more candidates rather than
fewer: voting liquid is not “scarce” at all, and each ap-
proved candidate is “helped” the same amount regardless
of how many other candidates the voter also approves.
Cumulative voting imposes a high cost on vote spreading:
e.g., a voter who expresses equal support for two candi-
daters will help each of those candidates half as much as
a plumping voter.
Quadrative voting, in contrast, effectively incentivizes
vote spreading by imposing some cost – but a moderate,
attenuated cost – on supporting more options. A voter
who plumps all of his liquid on only one candidate maxi-
mizes the amount he helps that single candidate but loses
“cost-efficiency” in doing so. A voter who spreads his liq-
uid among two or more candidates helps each candidate
less but maximizes the aggregate amount he helps all the
candidates he supports. In Figure 4, for example, voter (c)
uses all of his voting liquid to help option 3, maximizing
the amount he helps that option (2.2× the baseline bal-
loon height in (b)), whereas voter (e) provides less help to
each of the four option he supports but while helping all
of them more in aggregate (4.4× the baseline).
Risks of Coercion and Illegal Vote-Buying: While QV
has certain appeal, it also comes with risks. For example,
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Figure 3: Example paper ballot for liquid cumulative vot-
ing
QV assumes that voters exercise their free choice inde-
pendently and cannot collude with other voters outside the
electoral system. If voters can secretly coerce or collude
with each other, they can secretly buy or trade votes at
only linear cost per vote rather than the quadatic cost that
QV intends to impose. Suppose for example that Eve has
four QV coins or tokens with which to cast a vote for an
issue or candidate she cares about. If she votes honestly,
she will be able to buy and cast two votes. If she can se-
cretly find four apathetic voters willing to cast one vote
each on her behalf in exchange for an equivalent of one
coin each on some black market, then she can effectively
cast four votes through these co-conspirators, and sell the
use of her four coins on the same black market, exactly
recovering her cost while doubling its effective power.
In practice it seems unlikely that any implementa-
tion of QV could prevent secret coercion and collusion
risks entirely, short of pervasively surveiling all voters’
interactions with each other and eliminating their pri-
vacy and free choice in the process. These risks could
be mitigated by coercion-resistance mechanisms such as
“receipt-freeness” in properly-designed voting systems,
however, ensuring that if Eve tries to buy votes from co-
conspirators, she has no way of verifying that they “stayed
bought” and actually cast the votes she paid them to.
For this reason, implementing proper coercion-resistance
mechanisms in systems implementing QV may be even
more important than in more traditional elections.
Risks of Rewarding Apathy and Distraction Politics:
Another important risk stems from the difference in
information and understanding between the “perfectly-
informed rational voter” that QV theory assumes and
the decidedly-imperfect, often poorly-informed and non-
rational character of real-world voters. In particular, QV’s
theoretical analysis makes no account for the gap be-
tween the perfect rational voter’s understanding and a real
voter’s understanding of their situation: e.g., the differ-
ence between issues the voter doesn’t much care about be-
cause those issues in fact don’t greatly affect him, and is-
sues the voter doesn’t much care about because he doesn’t
understand how much they affect him when in fact they
do. A voter in the latter situation, who lacks sufficient un-
derstanding of and appreciation for the extent to which a
given issue actually affects them in reality, will “under-
spend” on that issue when making choices in a pure QV
system, investing little or nothing on this issue and saving
their coin for other issues she knows she cares about.
Thus, QV presents a risk of incentivizing and even re-
warding voters to be apathetic and not cast any vote on
issues they know little about, even if in reality it is in their
best interests to know about and vote on those issues. It
is hard enough in practice to get voters to show up and
vote at all, let alone ask them to pay – even with special-
purpose voting “coin” or liquid – to vote on candidates or
issues of vague and uncertain significance to them!
Further, deployingQV naively in public elections could
greatly compound the already-serious problem of distrac-
tion politics [45, 84, 55]. To whatever extent powerful
or moneyed interests can distract voters’ attention toward
“bright shiny objects” such as political scandals, divisive
social issues (e.g., immigration) or divisive moral contro-
versies (e.g., abortion), and cause voters to invest most
of their voting power in votes for or against these contro-
versial candidates or issues, special interests can thereby
draw the bulk of the public’s voting power away from
matters the special interests actually care about and en-
sure that votes they care about meet little public resis-
tance. Whereas conventional distraction politics merely
relies on voters not paying close enough attention to no-
tice and vote against special interests, quadratic voting
could give the practitioner of distraction politics an even
stronger economic weapon with which to sap the voting
power of potential public opposition.
3 Liquidity in Proportional Repre-
sentation via Transferable Voting
In addition to being subdivisible, another important prop-
erty of a physical liquid is that it flows, changing its po-
sition and shape easily while preserving a nearly-constant
total volume. A liquid’s flow can easily be directed (e.g.,
by channels or tubes), much more easily than solids for
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(a) Example of an empty ballot in its initial
state before the voter has allocated “voting
liquid” to any issues or candidates.
(b) Example of a hypothetical voter who ex-
presses no preference by allocating equal
voting liquid to each of the options. The net
effect is the same as an initial/empty ballot.
(c) Example of a voter who supports only
one option, using all five parts of voting liq-
uid to cast
√
5 votes.
(d) Example of a voter who supports two op-
tions, one strongly using four parts of liquid
to cast two votes, the other weakly using one
part of liquid to cast one vote.
(e) Example of a voter who supports all but
one option, allocating the voting liquid in
equal parts among the other four options.
(f) Example tally of the three example ballots (c), (d), (e) above.
Figure 4: Liquid quadratic voting examples
example. In viewing democratic voting power as a virtual
liquid, we can consider the “flow” property as enabling
users to direct their voting power in more flexible ways
while preserving preserving the democratic principle of
equality, meaning in this case that everyone has the same
voting power (the same volume of liquid) regardless of
what they do with it. We can find precedent for legitimate
transfer of voting power in many well-established systems
for democracy, and in some cases visualizing these trans-
fers of power as “flows” of a virtual liquid may potentially
help people understand these systems.
One precedent for treating democratic voting power as
liquid flows may be found in transferable voting systems
such as Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) and Single Transfer-
able Vote (STV), discussed next. IRV and STV ask voters
not just to pick a single choice but to rank their choices in
preference order, and automatically transfers votes down
this sequence as candidates are eliminated or elected in
the vote-tallying process.
3.1 Single-Winner Elections: Instant
Runoff Voting (IRV)
A basic, long-recognized problem with single-winner
elections in which there are more than two candidates or
choices is that none of the candidates might obtain a ma-
jority of the votes. In fact it’s quite possible for the candi-
date least favored by amajority of the population to win, if
that candidate’s minority support is focused but the major-
ity’s vote is split among two or more similar candidates.
This is the source of the “spoiler effect” , the threat of
which pressures voters to vote strategically for a “lesser
of two evils” instead of expressing their true preferences,
when their preferred candidate has little chance of win-
ning.
This conflict between strategy and true expression of
preferences is the reason many countries schedule a sep-
arate runoff election if no majority winner emerges from
the initial multi-candidate election. However, runoff elec-
tions are costly in many ways including additional time
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required, election administration expenses, and attrition
of voter attention.
This problem motivated instant runoff voting, which
essentially asks voters to cast ballots only once but pro-
vide on those ballots all the information the voting au-
thority needs to perform a virtual runoff election “in-
stantly,” if needed, without voters’ further immediate in-
volvement in each round. The key is to ask voters to in-
dicate not just first-choice candidates but to rank any or
all of the candidates in preference order. After collecting
these rank-order ballots, the election authority uses them
in a multi-round elimination process in which the weakest
candidate in each round is eliminated and that candidate’s
votes transferred to next-choice candidates on the respec-
tive voters’ ballots.
One way to visualize this process of automatically
transferring voting power to next-choice candidates on a
ranked ballot is to consider voting power as a liquid whose
flow can be guided and pumped, as illustrated in Figure 5.
In this simple IRV example, eight voters total cast bal-
lots with three different preference orders (3×AB, 3×BC,
and 2×CB). Each voter’s ballot starts with an equal allot-
ment of imaginary voting liquid, initially in a container
representing the voter’s first-choice candidate. In the first
IRV round, each ballot’s liquid flows to a larger container
that accumulates the aggregate “political support” of the
voters’ first-choice candidates. If one of the candidates’
“fluid level” reaches the quota line representing majority
support, that candidate wins the election.
In the Figure 5 example, however, there is no majority,
so the weakest candidate C is eliminated. Since C no
longer has a chance to win the election or make use of
the voting power conferred by C’s immediate supporters,
IRV “pumps” C’s accumulated voting liquid back to the
supporters’ ballots, where the respective beakers forC are
likewise closed, allowing each affected voter’s liquid to
flow to the next-choice candidate. In this example, the two
supporters of C pickedB as their second choice, enabling
B to reach a majority and win the election in the second
round.
While the liquid analogy is by no means necessary or
the only easy way to explain and understand IRV, it is ap-
pealing in several ways. First, it directly embodies the ba-
sic democratic principles of “rule by the people” (liquid
power flowing from voters’ ballots to their chosen candi-
dates) and equality (every voter having an equal volume
of voting liquid, which is preserved wherever and how-
ever it flows). More specifically to IRV, this analogy il-
lustrates how a single-winner candidate can obtain a ma-
jority of the population’s delegated political power (repre-
sented by B’s accumulation of a majority of total voting
liquid), and thus can lay claim to legitimate representation
of the majority, even if the population’s first-choice votes
are split among many candidates. Finally, this visualiza-
tion uses the capacity of liquid to “flow” in two important
respects: first in terms of explicitly representing the dele-
gation of power from “the people” to their representatives,
and second in terms of representing the automatic transfer
of power to next-choice candidates across rounds as weak
candidates are eliminated.
The liquid analogy becomes even more relevant, how-
ever, as we extend it to multi-winner elections.
3.2 Multi-Winner Elections: Single Trans-
ferable Vote (STV)
Single Transferable Vote (STV) is a generalization of
IRV’s principles to multi-winner elections in which there
are both multiple candidates and multiple seats to be
filled. STV’s goals are not only to avoid votes being
wasted, but also to achieve proportional representation,
ensuring that any sufficiently-large minority group can
elect a number of representatives in approximate propor-
tion to the group’s size.
Like IRV, STV’s goal is to encourage voters to express
their true preferences instead of being pressured to vote
strategically, and to minimize the number of “wasted”
votes that do not help elect (or contribute to the perceived
legitimacy of) a winning candidate in the end. When there
are not just one but n seats to be filled, STV observes
that under suitable conditions it is possible to assure that
fewer than 1/(n + 1) votes are “wasted,” a fraction that
decreases toward zero (no waste) as the number of seats
n increases. To achieve this goal, however, STV must
address not just one but two reasons why votes might be
“wasted”: first, as in IRV, votes for first-choice candidates
not popular enough to win; and second, unlike IRV, “ex-
tra” votes for choice candidates who received more votes
than necessary to win.
Consider a naı¨ve multi-winner extension to IRV, for ex-
ample, in which we simply eliminate the weakest candi-
dates in succession, transfering their votes to next-choice
candidates according to the ballots, and halt this process
when there are n candidates not yet eliminated. Sup-
pose that the most-popular first-choice candidate received
twice the number of votes needed to win a seat, typically
defined by the Droop quota: Q = ⌊v/(n+ 1)⌋+1, where
v is the total number of valid ballots. In this case, half
of this popular candidate’s votes are effectively “wasted”
in that they were not needed (in retrospect) to elect this
candidate, and they did not help elect any other (perhaps
closely-aligned) candidates either in the end, because IRV
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(a) First round: voting power from all ballots flows to each voter’s
first-choice candidate.
(b) Second round: weakest candidate C eliminated; C’s voting
power “pumped” back to voters’ ballots, then “flows” (i.e., is trans-
ferred) to C voters’ second-choice candidates.
Figure 5: Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) example illustrated via “liquid flows” of voting power
only ever transfers votes from eliminated candidates. It
might have been strategically preferable for this popular
candidate to encourage some (up to half) of her voters to
vote for another allied but less popular candidate – but this
reintroduces the strategy conundrum, and may be risky if
the popular candidate has overestimated her support.
Mature STV systems, therefore, transfer not only the
votes of eliminated candidates but also the “extra” votes
of elected candidates, so that a maximum number of votes
eventually apply toward electing some candidate to one of
the n seats. In particular, STV follows an iterative pro-
cess as in IRV, but at each step we first check whether
any current “hopeful” candidate has passed the vote quota
Q needed to win a seat. If so, we mark that candidate
“elected” rather than “hopeful,” transfer any extra votes
for that candidate beyond Q to next-choice candidates,
and then proceed to the next iteration without eliminating
any candidate. STV eliminates candidates (transferring
all of their votes as in IRV) only when it reaches a stage
where no hopeful candidate has yet reached the quota Q
but there are still more than n uneliminated candidates.
The Difficulty of Transferring “Extra” Ballots from
Elected Candidates: This refinement creates a signif-
icant second-order difficulty, however: since only some
votes for elected candidates are to be transferred, which
specific ballots are to be transferred? This question mat-
ters, and can affect the election’s outcome for the remain-
ing candidates, because each ballot may have a different
rank-ordering. For example, suppose the election author-
ity takes the extra ballots from the “top of the pile,” those
tend to be ballots cast most recently, and A’s late-voting
supporters tend to rank their ballots ABC whereas a sim-
ilar number of A’s earlier-voting supporters tend to vote
ACB. Then candidate B may have a significant advantage
over C and benefit from many ABC ballots being trans-
ferred and most ACB ballots left behind.
As a result, many STV systems require that the choice
of the ballots to be transferred be random. Introducing
randomness into the vote-counting process brings further
problems, however: it is harder (and perhaps impossible)
to perform a precise recount without the outcome varying
purely due to a change in the random choices; it is hard to
verify independently that the randomness used was truly
random and unbiased; and in general voters may right-
fully question whether and why part of the election pro-
cess should be run like a lottery.
Here again, taking the perspective of voting power as
a liquid may be helpful, this time in a way that leverages
both the divisibility and flow properties of physical liq-
uids. Some STV variants, such as Meek’s [57, 42] and
Warren’s [83], rather than transferring a selected fraction
of (whole) ballots from elected candidates, instead trans-
fer all of the ballots from elected candidates but at a frac-
tion of their original voting power. This refinement al-
lows STV to operate with no randomness except in the
typically-rare case of perfect ties – but the mechanisms
are complex, subtle, difficult to explain to ordinary voters,
and even the experts have trouble agreeing on the precise
rules [41].
While the liquid analogy by no means makes STV
“simple,” nevertheless it may be helpful in intuitively un-
derstanding, and explaining, the fractional ballot-transfer
in STV variants like Meek’s and Warren’s. Consider the
example in Figure 6 of an STV election with eight ballots,
three candidates, and two seats. In the first round, popu-
lar candidate A easily wins one seat, accumulating voting
liquid from four ballots despite needing only three to win.
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(a) First round: voting power from all ballots flows to each voter’s
first-choice candidate. Popular candidate A with four first-choice
votes exceeds the 3-vote quota needed to win a seat.
(b) Second round: the extra 1/4 of A’s voting power is “pumped”
back to refill A-voter ballots partially, allowing their second-
choice preferences to help elect B.
Figure 6: Single Transferable Vote (STV) example illustrated via subdivisible liquid flows of voting power
To avoid wasting this extra voting liquid, A retains only
the 3-vote quota needed to win a seat, and the extra voting
liquid is “pumped” back and distributed evenly among the
ballots that had voted for A, only partially refilling each
ballot. This excess voting power of A’s voters then flows
to each ballot’s next-choice candidate, in this case B, who
then has enough aggregate liquid to win the second seat.
The liquid analogy may thus help clarify why it makes
sense for Meek’s or Warren’s versions of STV to trans-
fer fractions of votes. In this analogy, all three interest-
ing properties of liquids are relevant: the fact that liquid
flows (voting power is both delegable to candidates and
transferable to next choices), that liquid is subdivisible
(an elected candidate retains only the required fraction of
voting power they received), and that liquid is volume-
preserving (each voter’s equal amount of voting liquid al-
ways “goes somewhere” and is neither lost nor artificially
expanded, and most of it goes toward electing the n win-
ning candidates). In these ways, the mature versions of
STV seem to represent a strong, established precedent for
key elements of liquid democracy.
Of course, the liquid analogy is not perfect, and in par-
ticular does not precisely reflect some of the subtleties
of either Meek’s or Warren’s systems – but those sub-
tleties tend to be corner-cases likely to affect outcomes
extremely rarely in practice. Further, the liquid democ-
racy perspective might in fact suggest further potentially-
interesting tweaks to STV, such as eliminating the need
to calculate the winning quota as an integral number of
votes as in the Droop quota: the “floor” and final+1 parts
of the quota calculation are probably unnecessary since a
non-integral “amount of voting liquid” is not nearly the
problem that a non-integral “number of votes” may sound
like.
3.3 Risks and Disadvantages of Ranked
Voting Systems
While IRV and STV hold considerable appeal, they also
havewell-known disadvantages. Asking voters to rank the
candidates is arguably more complex than simply asking
voters to pick one, or even to mark whichever ones they
support as in Approval voting. Paper IRV and STV ballots
with many candidates can require large N × N square
matrices of ovals to fill, scaling poorly to elections with
many candidates.
In addition, IRV and STV are often criticized as tend-
ing to prefer extremists over moderates, because middle-
of-the-road candidates who may be many voters’ second
choice but not many voters’ first choice will be eliminated
early, leaving a contest between more extreme candidates
with focused bases of first-choice support. To avoid early
elimination, centrist candidates must defend themselves
“on both sides” from more extreme competitors, while
the extremists might need to defend only one front – and
if the first-choice voter support for centrist candidates is
split, then all of themmaywell be eliminated before trans-
ferred votes start having an impact. For this reason, an
informal “rule of thumb” in IRV/STV campaigning is that
only first-choice votes matter: if you can’t convince the
voter to make you their first choice, move on. It is thus
questionable whether IRV or STV truly enable voters to
avoid strategic thinking and “vote their conscience” by
supporting a first-choice candidate who has little chance
of winning.
Besides the risk of overloading voters with “too
much choice,” which we will address further below, the
information-richness of ranked voting creates a more sub-
tle risk of coercion and vote-buying. Since the mature
STV implementations typically require computers to per-
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form the nontrivial “flow” calculations, for transparency
it is desirable for the “raw” list of anonymized ballots
to be published in full so that anyone can independently
repeat and verify the STV calculations. However, even
if all IRV ballots are fully anonymized and disconnected
from their voters’ identities, either physically (via shuf-
fling in a ballot box) or electronically (via verifiable cryp-
tographic shuffle), each ballot’s rank-choice list carries
enough information to make ballots potentially uniquely-
identifiable.
An STV ballot asking voters to rank only 10 candi-
dates, for example, offers 3.6 million (10 factorial) pos-
sible complete rankings. A vote-buyer might ask a voter
to cast an STV ballot with a particular ranking of all 10
candidates, the first one or two of which the vote-buyer
chooses according to his preferences and the remaining
ones randomly, which will effectively “watermark” the re-
quested ballot by making it unique with high probability.
The vote-buyer then simply watches for this specific rank-
ing to appear in the published election outcome, and pays
the voter only if it does.
3.4 Cumulative Transferable Vote (CTV):
Proportional Representation with Vote
Spreading
Viewing existing voting systems such as those above
through the lens and framework of the liquid voting
power analogy, for purposes of both vote spreading (ap-
proval, cumulative, quadratic voting) and vote transfer
(IRV, STV), makes other potentially-interesting variations
more readily-apparent. Observe that IRV and STV main-
tain a “winner-take-all” approach to interpreting ballots in
each round, in that each voter’s ballot can help only “one
candidate at a time”; vote transfer merely allows a ballot
to help different candidates in different rounds. There ap-
pears to be nothing fundamentally essential about this “se-
rial winner-take-all” approach, however. We could read-
ily combine the vote-spreading mechanisms of approval,
cumulative, or quadratic voting with the transfer mecha-
nisms of IRV and STV, and there may be interesting ad-
vantages to doing so.
First consider a variant we’ll call cumulative transfer-
able vote or CTV, a combination of cumulative voting we
propose with STV-like vote transfer for multiwinner elec-
tions. In this variation, voters conceptually divide a fixed
amount of “voting liquid” into parts and assign them to
candidates as they prefer, exactly as in Figure 2. Elec-
tions could also use the paper ballot approach in Figure 3
with multiple fillable ovals per candidate, in which voters
may fill any set of ovals to divide and assign their voting
power in that many parts.
Given a set of cast ballots expressed this way, how-
ever, we use a multi-round process as in STV to tally them
and choose winners. In each round, we first check if any
candidates have more than a winning quota of 1/(k + 1)
fraction of the total voting liquid in play, where k is the
number of candidates not yet elected or eliminated. If
so, each candidate above this threshold is marked elected,
and exactly as in Meek’s STV [57, 42], any surplus voting
liquid above this threshold is returned to the supporting
voters’ ballots in proportion to the voters’ respective con-
tributions. That surplus voting liquid is then redistributed
to any other candidates still in play (neither elected nor
eliminated) on the respective voters’ ballots, while pre-
serving the voter-specified allocation ratios among those
remaining candidates in play. If in some round there is
no candidate over the 1/(k + 1) threshold, then the can-
didate with the least support (voting liquid) is eliminated,
exactly as in STV, and all the liquid that went to support-
ing this candidate is returned to the supporters’ ballots for
proportional redistribution among other candidates still in
play as above.
This variation has several attractive features. It assures
proportional representation while minimizing “wasted
votes” and reducing strategic voting incentives as in STV,
with a ballot structure nearly as simple as in plurality or
approval voting – or even just as simple, if we reduce it to
a “one fillable oval per candidate” ballot. By allowing vot-
ers to assign multiple parts to candidates as in Figure 3, we
give voters the ability to express both equal and unequal
amounts of support to different candidates, whereas IRV
and STV only meaningfully allow voters to express un-
equal levels of support through ranking. Thus, CTV com-
bines the ballot simplicity of approval voting, the richness
of expression of expression of cumulative voting, and the
proportional representation properties of STV.
Another potentially appealing property of CTV is that
voters who split their support among multiple candidates
will be helping all of them (at least some) in early rounds,
which may help moderate candidates with broad but dif-
fuse support avoid early elimination before vote transfer
can start helping them. Consider for example a voter
who splits his vote at a 2:1 ratio (3 parts total) between
most-preferred specialty candidate A who is unlikely to
win and a more mainstream candidate B with broader
but less-focused support. In CTV, even though specialty
candidate A gets more of the voter’s power in the ini-
tial round, mainstream candidate B gets some of it from
the start, reducing B’s risk of early elimination if many
voters spread their vote between different specialty candi-
dates and mainstream candidate B. If specialty candidate
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A is eliminated, then all of the example voter’s power is
transferred toward helping B in subsequent rounds. And
if either A or B is elected before the other is eliminated,
then any excess voting power is transferred to helping the
other.
A third appeal in CTV is the simplicity of its vote-
tallying calculations in relation to state-of-the-art STV
variants. In Meek’s STV, for example, the vote transfer
process for each round is a complex calculation that it-
self requires an iterative successive approximation pro-
cess amounting to solving a Linear Programming (LP)
problem [81]. CTV, in contrast, has no need either for
random selections of ballots to transfer or for iterative
approximations; all the relevant voting power or “liquid
transfer” adjustments can be done with a single straight-
forward pass through the ballots in each candidate elec-
tion/elimination round.
These appealing characteristics of CTV are only infor-
mal and intuitive, of course. We make no pretense of
being able to perform a thorough analysis of CTV here;
such an analysis and comparison with other alternatives
remains for future work.
3.5 Quadratic Transferable Vote (QTV):
Rewarding Vote Spreading
A similar combination of the liquid elements of quadratic
voting and STV suggest another intriguing hybrid we’ll
call quadratic transferable vote or QTV. In this variant,
we give each voter an equal measure of virtual liquid,
which they can divide into parts and use to fill virtual “wa-
ter balloons” for the candidates they support, as illustrated
in Figure 4. The simplified paper ballot structure of Fig-
ure 3 is also possible here, since QTV identical to CTV in
the way voters express preferences but differs only in the
way the results are calculated.
As in STV and CTV, we calculate the results in multi-
ple rounds, electing candidates whose stack of virtual wa-
ter balloons exceeds the relevant 1/(k+ 1) height thresh-
old when k candidates are in play, or eliminating the
weakest candidate if no candidate is above the threshold.
When a candidate is elected, we “deflate” all the balloons
in the winning candidate’s stack so that their aggregate
height exactly matches the threshold. In this deflation pro-
cess, we preserve the proportions among the balloons’ re-
spective heights (diameters), i.e., preserving the percent-
age of total height each voter contributed toward electing
the candidate. The liquid we recover from deflating the
elected candidates’ balloons this way returns to the sup-
porting voters’ ballots, just as in CTV, for redistribution
to other candidates still in play according to the user’s ex-
pressed preferences.
As in quadratic voting, QTV effectively rewards vot-
ers for spreading their vote – especially in early rounds
when many candidates remain in play – because the ag-
gregate stack-height impact of a vote spread widely is
greater than the stack-height impact of a vote plumped
onto one balloon. This property effectively encourages
voters to allocate at least one part of their vote to each
candidate they support at all, while allowing them to “pay
more” (at an efficiency cost) to help their most-preferred
candidates more than others. We may also expect QTV to
help candidates with a broad base of support, even if many
of their supporters spread their vote among several candi-
dates, perhaps further reducing the risk of early elimina-
tion to moderates with a broad but diffuse support base.
If a voter decides to support two candidates equally in-
stead of just one, for example, then each of those candi-
dates still individually get
√
1/2, or about 70%, of the
“help” they would get if the voter supported them alone.
A voter who splits his vote equally among four candidates
helps each one 50% as much as he would by plumping
on one alone, and thus helps the four candidates 2× as
much in aggregate. Because a coalition of candidates re-
ceives more aggregate help from voters who spread sup-
port among all of them, this effect may incentivize candi-
dates to “be civil,” build or join coalitions, and encourage
voters to support other candidates they consider reason-
able in addition to themselves.
A voter who strongly prefers specialty candidate A but
also supports more mainstream candidate B at a 3:1 ratio
helps A 82% as much as by plumping, while also helping
B 50% as much. If the voter’s preferred candidate A is
eliminated, then all the voter’s liquid transfers to support
B at 100% rather than 50%. If A is elected, then only the
excess voting liquid that “wasn’t needed” to help A gets
transfered to B, subsequently supporting B at some level
between 50% and 100% of a plumping vote.
In summary, QTV appears attractive in that it allows
and encourages users to support multiple reasonable can-
didates, enables users to express both equal and unequal
strength of preference, ensures proportional representa-
tion and avoids wasting votes as in STV, and like CTV
is much simpler to calculate than non-random STV vari-
ants such as Meek’s. To whatever (perhaps limited) ex-
tent that real voters match the ideal rational model that
quadratic voting assumes, QTV should incentive voters
to express their “true strength of preference” in deciding
which candidates to support and by howmuch. These fea-
tures suggest QTV is promising, but we leave many ques-
tions and subtleties for future work, such as precise analy-
sis of QTV’s properties in comparison with other systems,
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and the handling of subtleties such as the negative votes
that quadratic voting proposes to allow.
4 Liquidity in Delegation to Sim-
plify or Aid in Choice
The above sections have discussed precedents that in-
crease the richness of voter choice, to allow splitting
vote power and expressing (relative) strength of prefer-
ence (Section 2), to avoid “wasting” votes in majoritar-
ian or proportional elections (Section 3). Increased rich-
ness of choice also place a burden on voters, however,
many of whommay have little time or inclination to study
carefully and come to an informed understanding of the
choices available.
For this reason, many voting and ballot schemes make
provisions to simplify, manage, and perhaps even de-
crease the richness of choice available, often by enabling
(or even requiring) voters to delegatemany details of their
choices, most commonly to their preferred party. Taking
the liquid analogy, we can view such delegation as tran-
sitive flows of voting power: e.g., from voters to parties,
then from parties to candidates, and finally from elected
representatives to decisions on specific laws or issues.
4.1 Precedents for Delegation to Simplify
and Manage Choice
We observe two clear precedents for delegation of demo-
cratic power as a way to simplify or manage choice: first,
the basic structure of representative democracy, and sec-
ond, political parties.
4.1.1 Representative Democracy:
Small communities sometimes practice direct democracy,
in which ideally all eligible voters discuss, deliberate on,
and participate in decions on all significant decisions af-
fecting the community. Because the complexity of gover-
nance and the total number of decisions to be made tends
to grow proportionally with the size of community, how-
ever, the pure ideal of direct democracy rarely functions
well beyond small communities of tens or at most hun-
dreds of participants. This scaling challenge, caused by
the inevitably limited time and attention of ordinary cit-
izens, necessitated the now far-more-common represen-
tative form of democracy, in which voters only periodi-
cally elect representatives who specialize in carrying out
the day-to-day tasks of political decision-making.
Although pure direct democracy does not readily scale
to large democracies, elements of direct democracy such
as popular initiatives and referenda became a fixture of
the Swiss federal constitution in the 19th century, and
have since been adopted in many governments around the
world. In this hybrid approach, while elected representa-
tives still handle most decision-making, the electorate is
directly involved in select decisions on major issues. In
effect, the people delegate their political power for most
day-to-day governance decisions to their representatives,
but retain direct involvement in certain decisions, includ-
ing the potential ability to override decisions of their rep-
resentatives. This general notion of power delegation with
a possibility of override is a recurring idea we also see in
party systems, discussed next, and generalized further in
today’s liquid democracy ideas, which we will return to
later.
4.1.2 Political Parties and Straight-Ticket or Party-
List Voting:
While political parties in practice serve many functions,
one of them is to simplify the choices of voters who may
not have sufficient time or interest to keep up with the
many candidates or issues on a ballot individually, but
feel a close-enough affiliation with some political party to
leave many of the details of their decisions to their party:
e.g., by voting for candidatesmainly because of their party
affiliation.
In most governmental elections it is typical for bal-
lots to display party affiliation prominently alongside can-
didates’ names, and making it easy and fairly common
(though by no means universal) for voters simply to vote
for all the candidates from their preferred party if they
choose. Certainly it is common in many elections for
ballots to list many candidates across multiple open po-
sitions, about whom many voters are likely to know little
to nothing. Thus, many of the votes that go toward elect-
ing “down-ballot” candidates are likely to be party-line
votes, whose candidates may benefit substantially from
the “coattail effect” from voters showing up mainly to
vote for some other more prominent candidate or issue.
Historical US elections even used ballot designs in
which each each party had its own differently-colored bal-
lot, making voting easy for straight-ticket voters but more
difficult and confusing for split-ticket voters, who would
need to mark and cast two or more differently-colored bal-
lots. Even today, a number of states use ballot designs
allowing voters to cast a straight-ticket ballot for all their
party’s candidates by marking a single option. Texas not
only provides this option, but also allows voters to over-
ride the party-line vote for specific races by marking a
candidate from another party for that race.
Many European election systems take this philosophy
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of simplifying choice through party delegation even fur-
ther, in the form of party-list proportional representation.
In such designs, voters choose only parties, each of which
has published a ranked list of that party’s candidates for
the available seats. After ballots are counted, each party
that reaches a minimum popular vote threshold is awarded
a number of seats in proportion to the total vote for that
party, in the ranked order defined by the party. Party-
list proportional representation can thus be viewed as a
constrained variant of STV, in which voters cannot spec-
ify their own candidate ranking but must instead choose
among a small number of predefined rankings, one per
party.
In summary, allowing – or even requiring – voters to
delegate many or all specific details of their choice to their
preferred party is a common and accepted practice, if not
without many potential strengths and weaknesses.
4.2 Few Versus Many Parties: Countering
or Merely Obscuring Extremes?
Political parties have become a ubiquitous structural
mechanism not only to organize races for power in
democracies, but also to simplify voters’ choices by en-
abling (and sometimes requiring) them to delegate details
of their decisions to their preferred party. The number of
parties people have to choose from, however, is usually
severely limited for structural reasons. Two-party sys-
tems such as the US based on “winner-take-all” elections
strongly discourage the rise of third parties due in part to
fear of the spoiler effect [5, 66]. While the proportional
representation systems common in Europe more readily
accommodate multiple parties, to be politically relevant
they must have enough direct support to obtain at least
one representative seat. Further, to obtain any represen-
tation parties must often pass a legal threshold (e.g., 5%),
typically imposed out of fear of extremist parties [15].
These structural constraints favoring large parties force
them to aggregate and effectively hide the complex orga-
nizational and activist structures within parties, the issue-
centric campaigns and influence structures outside of par-
ties, and the vast constellation of actual reasons people
cast the votes they do. How many people voted for a
particular party due to general alignment with the party’s
platform or ideology, how many due to alignment on a
single issue the voter considers most critical, how many
due to personal attraction to a particular candidate, and
how many solely because the opposing party or candidate
seems worse? After an effective local activist or issue-
focused organization successfully persuades a citizen to
town out and vote for their cause, the electoral system ob-
scures that fact in an anonymous statistical bump, aggre-
gated with all the other distinct reasons that other voters
turned out (or didn’t) to vote for particular candidates or
issues. This aggregation leaves the actual causes of influ-
ence to be merely guessed at by pundits and journalists,
or estimated via bias- and error-prone opinion and exit
polls [19, 9].
Limiting choice obscures not only the motivations of
voters but also the motivations of non-voters: the often-
sizeable percentage of the eligible electorate who do not
actually vote. For example, does the silence of a non-
voter express lack of interest in general, lack of time to
go vote or meet associated registration or identity pro-
cess requirements, or does silence represent a vote for
“none of the above”—merely a disapproval of those few
particular choices that were laid before the voter? How
many of today’s non-voters might become voters if they
were given the choices they actually desire? While online
digital forums can obscure the motivations of silent com-
munities [31, 6], offline political structures set far earlier
precedent for such exclusion.
We have many reasons to suspect that structural limi-
tations on the breadth of party choice may not so much
prevent extremism so much as sweep it into a corner and
temporarily out of sight, until it suddenly bursts through
or circumvents the structural barriers intended to contain
it [15, 34]. Even if the US’s two-party structure pre-
vented the Tea Party from technically being a true polit-
ical “party,” it did not prevent the movement from fun-
damentally shifting the Republican party’s positions and
discourse [1, 74].
When partisan competition gives rise to cultural polar-
ization and tribalism, identity politics can lead people to
vote against their own interests [77]. When the working
structures of political organization must reach large pop-
ulation segments to win votes, they become dependent on
money to achieve those scales, incentivizing representa-
tives to exploit cultural divisions and fears to win votes
while quietly sculpting their policy choices around the in-
terests of their elite donors [33, 75, 76].
In short, large-scale political organization inevitably
relies on vast networks of fine-grainted structures both
within and around the few major parties in a country, and
leaving those structures outside of the electoral system
and their effects hidden in aggregate election results both
deprives us of important information and exposes those
structures to corruption. Can we, and perhaps should we,
bring these fine-grained structures into the sunlight and
make them both visible and accountable?
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4.3 Revealing Choice Structures through
Transparent Delegation
Since accepted democratic structures already embody
multiple transitive levels of decision delegation – e.g.,
from voters to parties to representatives – it is not such
a stretch to envision allowing further levels of delegation,
allowing voters to express their preferences in terms of
more fine-grained organizational structures. Instead of
parties and partisan voters appearing to the electoral sys-
tem as a monolithic mass of undifferentiated votes as they
do now, major parties might then represent masses of vot-
ing power collected and aggregated frommany smaller or-
ganizational structures by delegation more explicitly and
transparently via the electoral system.
Giving voters the power to delegate their choices is cen-
tral to many conceptions of liquid democracy. But if we
were to embrace and expand this power of delegation be-
yond a choice between a few large parties, what – or who
– should we allow voters delegate to? We explore four
potential alternatives: delegation to finer-grained parties
or microparties, delegation to issue-centric organizations,
delegation to individuals, and delegation to algorithms.
4.4 Delegation to Microparties: Expanded
Choice among Political Parties
One way to allow for more fine-grained structures might
be to embrace the concept of microparties. We infor-
mally define a microparty as an organization representing
a group of voters that may be too small and narrowly-
focused to have a realistic chance of obtaining even one
seat in a large-scale public election. A microparty might
instead, for example, wield a (smaller amount of) power
by selectively delegating its supporters’ votes to, and
thereby influencing, larger parties. Microparties might
naturally specialize to narrower demographic audiences,
smaller geographic regions, or more specific party plat-
forms or ideologies than a major party can. Microparties
along some of these lines have formed spontaneously in
Australia in recent years, in fact, though as more of an un-
intended and not-always-welcome side-effect of unrelated
electoral reform rather than by design [50], and thus not
necessarily taking a form that we might prefer by design.
An essential attraction of microparties is that they can
be “closer” to their relevant segment of voters, both in
terms of responsiveness to their voters’ interests and in
terms of assisting and guiding the choices of their sup-
porting voters. By giving formal and explicit “recogni-
tion” to microparties in the electoral system, we might not
only expand the breadth of party choice voters have, but
also make it an explicit and transparent part of the public
record when they delegate their choices to a microparty.
Suppose, for example, that a microparty cannot realis-
tically find many candidates of its own to run for national
political offices, let alone hope to win those races. How-
ever, the microparty can nevertheless campaign among
its target population, and explicitly delegate the votes it
receives to major-party candidates who are most closely
aligned to the microparty on the issues most important to
the microparty. In a Party List Proportional Representa-
tion system, this might in principle be achieved simply by
permitting microparties to publish lists that include candi-
dates from other parties when they are not running enough
– or perhaps any – candidates of their own.
In a Single Transferable Vote system, microparties can
in effect do this in any case, simply by handing out “voter
advice” cards to their supporters showing the microparty’s
recommended rank-ordering of the available candidates
regardless of party affiliation. (It may be little coinci-
dence that microparties in some form emerged sponta-
neously in Australia, which depends heavily on STV.) In
a multi-election ballot for multiple races for local and re-
gional offices, a microparty could provide its supporters a
recommended selection of down-ballot candidates for all
those offices, cherry-picking from its own and other par-
ties’ candidates according to the microparty’s judgment of
best alignment with its position.
4.4.1 Election System Design for Delegation Trans-
parency:
With appropriate ballot design or electronic voting user
interfaces, microparty supporters might be able to adopt
the microparty’s choices in “straight ticket” fashion or se-
lectively override particular choices, just as Texas ballots
already permit in straight-ticket voting for major parties
(see Section 4.1.2). If we allow for a large number of mi-
croparties in the interest of choice, we should not expect –
or promise – that all microparties would be listed explic-
itly on limited-size printed ballots.
E-voting environments can easily solve the ballot scala-
bility problem, however, by allowing voters to look up the
microparty by the first few letters of its name, or by scan-
ning a QR code printed on the microparty’s printed voter-
advice card. The net effect on the actual electoral out-
comewould be identical to that if the voter simply brought
along the microparty’s voter-advice card to the ballot box
and entered manually entered the recommended choices
(overriding them as desired), which voters can do anyway
in most any election system. However, besides offering
the voter the convenience of automation, we might hope
to ensure that the fact that a specific number of voters fol-
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lowed the microparty’s recommendationswould be tallied
and appear in the election’s official outcome, giving ev-
eryone clear information on each microparty’s influence
structure: both how many people are following its recom-
mendations and where (e.g., to which major-party candi-
dates) its influence is flowing to.
If it were not only accepted but expected that micropar-
ties wield voting power mainly by delegating it transi-
tively to other parties large enough to win seats, then mi-
croparties could use the official, public information about
their power to negotiate and form alliances with larger
parties, the microparty offering formal support for some
of the major party’s candidates or issues, in exchange for
the major party’s consideration of the microparty’s in-
terests. This type of inter-party dance is already stan-
dard procedure between larger and smaller parties in
the coalition-building stages of multi-party governments.
Delegation through microparties might merely give large
and medium-size parties more choice of “dance partners”
of more wide-ranging sizes. Some microparties might
form stable, long-term, exclusive associations with larger
parties, effectively becoming subsidiaries, while other mi-
croparties might retain greater independence, switching
alliances regularly or choosing major-party candidates to
support on purely a basis of alignment with individual
candidates’ positions.
4.5 Delegation to Single-Issue Organiza-
tions – Exclusively or Jointly via Vote
Spreading
As mentioned above, one “limit case” of a microparty
is one that that might make no pretence of representing
an entire ideology or platform, but instead is organized
around a single issue or cause: e.g., a particular position
on health care, environment, human rights, jobs, etc. The
existence of such single-issue microparties might seem
slightly absurd and dysfunctional in an election system
that allows voters to choose only one candidate or party
for a particular office: how could we reasonably expect
anyone to choose an organization representing only one
issue to represent them and guide their choices?
One reason that allowing single-issue microparties
might be desirable, however, is to reveal the prevalence
(or lack thereof) of “single-issue voting.” If a certain seg-
ment of voters cares about one issue above all else, and
decides to support this microparty (and, by delegation, the
candidates it recommends) in preference to all the broader
platform-based parties or microparties, then it may be use-
ful for the major parties, and the general public, to know
this: i.e., to understand the perceived importance of that
issue. We cannot in any case prevent voters from choosing
a particular candidate because of their stance on a single
issue, but we can hope to gain understanding of how of-
ten that happens and on which issues. Allowing voters to
delegate through issue-based microparties would enable
that.
As we explored earlier in Section 2, however, there is
no fundamental reason we must force voters to make only
one choice in an election, and the same is true for dele-
gation. Suppose we design an election system allowing
voters not only to delegate their vote but also to subdivide
and spread it among multiple microparties they support,
perhaps with the ability to express strength of preference
as well as with cumulative (2.2) or quadratic voting (2.3).
This would effectiveley allow voters the freedom to “con-
struct their own platform” if they choose.
For example, if a voter strongly supports the position
of issue-based microparty A and weakly supports the po-
sitions of issue-based microparties B and C, she might
delegate her vote power to them at a 2:1:1 ratio. With
liquid cumulative voting, for example, a candidate sup-
ported only by party B will receive 1/4 of the voter’s
delegated vote. A candidate who for whatever reasons is
aligned with and supported by all three of these micropar-
ties A, B, and C will receive all of the voter’s delegated
vote, but via different paths. If the electoral system sta-
tistically reveals all of these delegations, then the major
parties and the public obtain valuable information about
not only the extent to which different candidates are sup-
ported, but also why they received support: i.e., through
which delegation paths in which amounts.
Of course, no voter would be obligated to “build their
own platform” this way: voters would still be free to del-
egate to more conventional parties or microparties rep-
resenting platforms bundling many issues together. And
once again, obtaining accurate information through the
electoral system about how many voters choose a bundled
platform or ideology, versus building their own platform
through vote-splitting, might represent a valuable public
good.
4.6 Delegation of Decisions to Individuals
Delegation of voting power to an arbitrary designated
individual has long been accepted practice in corporate
governance structures allowing proxy voting [67, 22, 2].
The idea of allowing voters to delegate to individuals
of their choice in general political processes has been
a recurring idea suggested by many people including
Heinlein [40], Tullock [79], Miller [58], Lanphier [54],
Ford [29], Sayke [69, 70], Green-Armytage [35, 36, 37],
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Alger [3], Boldi et al [11], and others. . Taken to its limit,
this approach in essence gives voters complete freedom to
choose individually who will represent them politically,
rather than being constrained to a few official candidates
or major parties – or even to a large but still-limited range
of microparties.
Many of these proposals envision electronic delibera-
tion systems reducing the costs of direct participation in
legislative processes enough that anyone who wants to
can serve as a legislator, participating in legislative de-
bates and committees while wielding the power of what-
ever arbitrarily large or small group of voters delegated
their vote to them. As Alger suggests, “we could have
legislatures that could allow quite large numbers and still
work well, possibly even allowing individuals that repre-
sent only themselves” [3].
Even with suitable electronic systems, however, it is not
easy to reduce the costs of direct participation to zero. In
any real-time deliberative public forum there tends to be
a limited amount of total “speaking time” whether the fo-
rum is physical or virtual, and even in a message-based
online forum (e.g., Twitter) there is a limit budget of total
human attention to messages being sent. Ford [29] and
Alger [3] propose apportioning speaking time and other
scarce resources to delegates in proportion to the dele-
gated votes they wield, and Alger suggests that this objec-
tive “pecking order” also be used instead of seniority to
decide organizational matters such as to prioritize selec-
tion of legislators to committees. If despite these provi-
sions it proves necessary to limit direct participation, both
Ford and Alger propose STV-inspired methods of elim-
inating delegates with the least support from direct leg-
islative participation, while still allowing eliminated dele-
gates to influence the decision process by transitively “re-
delegating” their voting power (Ford) or filling out incom-
plete preference lists of their supporting voters (Alger).
4.6.1 The Risk of Accidental Dictators:
Another issue with delegation to individuals is the po-
tential risk that voting power might become overly con-
centrated if many people delegate their vote to a popular
celebrity or ideologue. The German Pirate Party’s inter-
nal experiments with liquid democracy, in which one pro-
fessor happened to accumulate a large amount of voting
power, anecdotally confirm the plausibility of such risks
of creating “accidental dictators” through delegation [10].
Ford’s proposal anticipated this risk, allowing voters to
split their voting power and spread it among multiple del-
egates [29].
To mitigate this risk further, we could use Liquid
Quadratic Voting (Section 2.3) to incentivize voters to
“spread out” their delegated voting power and actively
reward them for doing so. For example, a voter who
splits her voting power in equal parts to delegates A and
B would increase each delegate’s voting power by
√
1/2,
or 71% of the amount of power either A or B would re-
ceive if the voter delegated to them alone – but in combi-
nation the two delegates receive 2
√
1/2 or 141% of the
baseline amount of voting power. Voters who spread their
delegated voting power more widely receive even more
of an effective “bonus” in aggregate voting power: e.g.,
a voter delegates equally to four delegating helps each of
them 1/2 as much as with single delegation, but helps the
group of them 2× as much in aggregate. Stated another
way, a celebrity or ideologue whose voters support only
her would need twice the number of total supporters to
wield the same voting power as a coalition of four dele-
gates whose supporters spread their power evenly among
the four.
4.6.2 The Anonymity Versus Accountability Conun-
drum:
Another problem with delegation to individuals is that we
generally want an individual voter’s choices to be private
and anonymous, to mitigate the risk of coercion or vote-
buying – but it seems that delegates who wields the vot-
ing power of others need to vote publicly in order to be
accountable to their supporters. If we allow anyone to be-
come a delegate with no required threshold of support or
other barriers to entry, then anyone who wants to coerce
a voter or buy their vote can simply require them to be-
come a delegate (perhaps representing only themselves)
and thus vote publicly, allowing the coercer or vote-buyer
to verify that the voter “stayed bought.” [30].
One way to mitigate this coercion risk might be to re-
quire a delegate to pass a certain threshold of voter support
before being allowed to wield delegated votes and cast
votes publicly. It is not clear how best to set such a support
threshold, however: setting it too high would eliminate the
voter freedom and breadth of choice that makes delegation
to individuals attractive in the first place. On the other
hand, it is not clear there is any support threshold “high
enough” to make a delegate impervious to coercion or
vote-buying, as suggested by evidence that national rep-
resentatives in today’s most well-established democracies
are often much more responsive to moneyed interests and
lobbyists than to their electorate [73, 75, 17, 28].
Perhaps a better way to address the coercion risk is to
keep each individual’s roles as voter and potential dele-
gate strictly separate in designing an electoral system sup-
porting delegation. An individual’s actions in the voter
role would always be private, and her actions in the del-
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egate role always public and hence accountable. In her
delegate role, a voter could publicly wield the delegated
votes of her followers (if any) in one way, but in her voter
role privately cast a vote different from – perhaps even
opposite of – her public stance, i.e., secretly declining to
support her own public position. A potential coercer or
vote-buyer can ensure that she takes the coercer’s stance
publicly, but cannot ensure that she actually casts her vote
that way privately. If she doesn’t, then her delegate role
will wield no actual voting power unless other voters in-
dependently choose to delegate to and support her public
platform. Since all of these original votes are likewise pri-
vate and annonymous, the would-be-coercer can buy the
coercee’s public platform but cannot actually coerce any-
one (even the coercee herself) to support it: if it receives
any delegated support at all, it is through the free choice of
individual voters casting their delegation choices anony-
mously. The coercee is then “coerced” only in the not-
necessarily-harmless but standard and fimilar mode of a
celebrity whose face and participation is purchased in an
advertising campaign: the coercer can do no more than try
to make the purchased platform attractive.
Viewed another way, from a “microparty” perspective,
we might in principle allow anyone to create a microparty
regardless of support, and to publish a corresponding “mi-
croparty platform” with recommended choices on candi-
dates and issues in an election. This public microparty
platform may be vulnerable to coercion or buying, by
virtue of being public as is required for accountability.
However, no one – not even the “leader” of the mi-
croparty who registered it – can actually be coerced to
vote according to the party’s public platform.
To ensure that a coercer can’t determine whether a del-
egate or microparty leader actually votes for her own pub-
lic platform, the electoral system must be designed not to
publish exact support statistics for delegates or micropar-
ties who receive a small amount of support (e.g., zero,
one, or a few votes). This could be accomplished either
by publishing voter support statistics only for delegates
or microparties that achieve some threshold of support,
or by deliberately adding noise to the published statistics
to guarantee the differential privacy of voters who do (or
don’t) support the delegate or microparty [25]. The sup-
port publication threshold or differentially private noise
level might need to be set considerably higher in areas
where not just individual but collective coercion might be
a risk: e.g., a crime lord threatening a local community
with collective punishment unless most or all of them del-
egate their vote to him or support his microparty.
4.7 Delegation to Tools or Algorithms
As an alternative to delegating decisions to organizations
or individuals, voters may wish to delegate some of their
decisions to, or “take advice” from, automated tools or
algorithms. In fact this is already occurring in practice,
through voters’ growing use of voting advice applications
or VAAs [32, 56, 43]. These tools often take the form of
convenient web sites that ask voters questions about their
opinions, and use algorithms to advise them about how
well- or poorly-matched particular candidates are to their
positions. A 2012 survey found that 20–40% of the elec-
torate had used VAAs in recent elections in several Euro-
pean countries [32]. On the one hand, such applications
appear attractive as tools to empower voters and help them
make more well-informed decisions. On the other hand,
such tools present significant risks, as the algorithms they
implement are often non-transparent, not readily under-
standable or explainable to most of their users, and the
advice they give can be affected (intentionally or not) by
many subtle design factors.
Even among the larger population of voters not con-
sciously seeking algorithmic advice on their decisions,
however, a high percentage of voters are unquestion-
ably relying on and indirectly influenced by the algo-
rithms underlying their social network newsfeeds to se-
lect, filter, learn about, and discuss events, and to in-
form their political opinions [63, 53]. Sensationalistic but
false news stories, produced either by ideologically- or
advertising-profit-motivated actors, can spread more ef-
fectively via social media and potentially influence vot-
ers’ opinions [4, 61]. The fact that these influence-
mediating algorithms are typically proprietary, controlled
and understood only by a few engineers in tech giants,
has sparked considerable concern about algorithmic trans-
parency [23, 21, 71]. Fake accounts operated by social
bots can further amplify the spread of misleading or fake
information [87, 26, 88, 13, 72].
Given the clear and considerable potential risks inher-
ent in empowering voters to delegate parts of their think-
ing to algorithms, we must proceed with extreme cau-
tion in even approaching the idea of endorsing such prac-
tices, let alone incorporating such capabilities into elec-
toral systems. Nevertheless, the issue may in the end boil
down to one of transparency. We ultimately cannot pre-
vent users from taking voting advice from algorithms, ei-
ther consciously (e.g., through VAAs) or unconsciously
(e.g., through social media newsfeeds), without also tak-
ing away their freedoms of privacy and choice. Given this
impossibility of prohibition, could we at least design fu-
ture electronic voting and decision systems to use more
transparent and less risky methods of following algorith-
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mic advice when they choose to do so?
One way we might envision supporting transparent al-
gorithmic delegation is by designing an electoral sys-
tem supporting advice-giving algorithms implemented in
a fashion similar to smart contracts in blockchain systems
such as Ethereum [86]. Such a system might offer users
the convenience of being able to use chosen VAA-like
tools available directly within the e-voting system, like
programmable “plug-ins” for the voting system. In ex-
change for this convenience, however, the election system
would enforce transparency of both code and usage. By
transparency of code we mean that, like Ethereum smart
contracts, in order to operate at all, the code (software)
implementing these VAA plug-ins would have to be pub-
licly registered (perhaps “on the blockchain” if the voting
system is blockchain-based) and open to anyone to inspect
for potential bugs or hidden malicious behavior (e.g., al-
gorithmic bias or influence manipulation attempts). By
transparency of usage we mean that when users do elect
to invoke such plug-in tools, the electoral system automat-
ically gathers and publishes accurate statistics on the prev-
elance of their usage, ensuring that the public and experts
alike can focus appropriate levels of attention to analyz-
ing the most popular tools that could potentially influence
significant voting power.
Even if we take the position that voters “should” think
for themselves, it may be worth viewing delegation of
choice to algorithms as a human vice not entirely unlike
drug abuse or prostitution: a behvaior that creates impor-
tant risks – to democratic health rather than public health –
that may most readily be mitigated not by either ignoring
or banning the practice outright, but rather by bringing it
out of the shadows where it can be monitored and tightly
regulated.
5 Liquidity in Scaling Direct
Democracy through Special-
ization
We have explored above how a liquid notion of voting
power can potentially enhance a voter’s choice in answer-
ing a given ballot question: e.g., spreading, transfering, or
delegating choice among candidates running for an office
or parliament. An important complementary issue, how-
ever, is how many and what kinds of questions a given
election or ballot asks voters to weigh in on. The ideal of
direct democracy is to involve voters directly in deciding
important policy questions that concern them, typically
through initiatives and referenda.
5.1 The Ballot and Voter Attention Scalabil-
ity Problems of Direct Democracy
Even in countries like Switzerland where direct democ-
racy is deeply rooted, however, the extent to which citi-
zens can in practice be directly involved in decisions is
severely constrained by the limited time and attention of
the electorate. Even while holding votes far more often
than in most countries (typically four times per year), and
localizing many direct decisions to cantons or municipal-
ities, Switzerland must impose fairly high barriers (e.g.,
100,000 signatures for popular initiatives in a country of
only 8 million) to keep the number of questions on each
ballot – and the magnitude of the task of informing the
voters about those questions – manageable.
The critical tension between the desire to involve vot-
ers directly in decisions, and the need to limit the num-
ber of such decisions on the ballot, stems from one basic
premise in traditional designs for direct democracy: that
every voter needs to be asked, and expected, to weigh in
on every question in each election. Constrained by this
premise, direct democracy faces a fundamental scalability
limitation. Since the number and breadth of policy ques-
tions affecting a society is likely to scale in proportion to
the size and complexity of that society, a “pure” direct
democracy would require a linear O(n) number of voters
each to answer a number of questions at each election that
may similarly grow linearly O(n) with population size,
resulting in an unscalable quadratic O(n2) overall deci-
sion workload. But could we circumvent this fundamental
decision scalability barrier if we relaxed the presumption
that all voters should be expected to answer all questions?
This is a central goal of a number of liquid democracy
proposals, particularly Ford’s [29], which gives voters a
“meta” level of choice to answer some questions directly
while delegating others to a representative.
5.2 Inspiration: Hierarchically Structured
Online Discussion Forums such as
UseNet
Concurrent with the early evolution of the Internet, the
first global, decentralized, public electronic discussion fo-
rum emerged in the form of UseNet [38]. A precur-
sor to today’s popular discussion platforms like Slash-
dot and Reddit, UseNet enabled millions of users from
thousands of organizations to post messages in subject-
oriented newsgroups that anyone elsewhere in the world
could read and respond to in followup debate. At its
height of popularity in the 1990s, UseNet inspired the
publication of dozens nonfiction guides to UseNet, studies
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of its users’ behavior [59, 48, 27, 80], and even interstellar
analogs in science fiction [82]. Most relevant to our pur-
poses, UseNet offered a censorship-resistant forum open
to anyone to speak or debate, but also proved scalable by
virtue of allowing each user to choose which subset of the
roughly 150,000 newsgroups to read and participate in or-
ganized into a deep hierarchy of topics.
UseNet never pretended to offer a forum for rigorous
democratic deliberation, and the censorship-resistance of
its decentralized structure eventually enabled spammers
to overrun it [18], sending most of its users scurrying
away to more closed or controlled forums. Nevertheless,
many of UseNet’s “netizens” [38] were inspired by the
perceived “democratizing” potential of a technology plat-
form offering anyone the freedom to speak online as much
or little as they choose, on any topic that interests them
– and to give readers the necessary corresponding free-
dom to manage their limited time and attention by choos-
ing which topics to follow closely and which to ignore
or leave to others. This perceived democratizing poten-
tial of scalable online forums doubtless inspired many of
the variants of liquid democracy that were proposed in
the early 2000s. This leads to a question that is still as
relevant as ever despite UseNet’s failure: is it possible to
enable open, public debate and deliberation, akin to the
processes of direct democracy, that would scale in rich-
ness, participation, and user choice like UseNet did at its
height? And could such a forum be created that both of-
fers strong freedom of speech without being overrun by
spam, trolling, and other forms of abuse [89, 16, 53]?
5.3 Scalable Direct Democracy via Topic
Specialization and Delegation
Let us now take it as given that we cannot lower the bar-
riers to voters proposing questions for direct democratic
debate and decisions (e.g., initiatives and referenda), and
thereby vastly expanding the potential number of ques-
tions “on the ballot” at any given time, without also giv-
ing users a choice of which (typically small) subset of
those questions to pay attention to, debate, and vote on di-
rectly. We could certainly manage a large number of top-
ics for direct democratic discussion by organizing them
UseNet-style into a hierrarchy of topics, giving each user
free choice of which to follow and which to ignore. So
let us suppose such a topic hierarchy exists, and for sim-
plicity assume for now that actual deliberation and choice
occurs only in the bottommost “leaf” subtopics that are
not further subdivided.
If only the users with enough time and interest to fol-
low a particular subtopic closely actually wield votes on
decisions related to that topic, however, then each small
subtopic will behave as a special-interest group, narrowly
representing the interests and opinions of the specific sub-
population of voters for whom that topic is of prime im-
portance. For legitimacy, democratic debate and deci-
sions on a topic somehow need to represent and account
for the interests of the whole population the topic affects,
not just those few with the time to make that topic their
focus. Healthcare policy affects everyone, not just doc-
tors and healthcare industry experts; economic policy af-
fects everyone, not just bankers and economists. This
need for representativeness remains applicable, and per-
haps becomes even more important, as we descend in our
hypothetical topic hierarchy to narrower subtopics: e.g.,
from healthcare as a “level 1” topic to a health insur-
ance subtopic at level 2 underneath it, from there to a
subtopic on pre-existing conditions policy at level 3, and
to a subtopic on pre-existing conditions policy specifically
for cancer patients at level 4. A tiny percentage of the total
population will likely be able to follow debates and par-
ticipate directly in decisions on such a low-level subtopic,
but nevertheless these decisions affect everyone, because
everyone is exposed to the risk that they might get cancer
and need insurance coverage if they do.
Representative democracy addresses this legitimate
representation challenge by delegating all these decisions
to a handful of elected representatives, at the cost of ef-
fectively overloading that handful of representatives with
so many complex policy decisions that the representatives
themselves can’t hope to become experts in any of them.
These representatives thus focusing instead on the profes-
sion of politics itself – being good at campaigning and get-
ting (re-)elected, rather than being good at making good
policy decisions on any one topic. These professional
politicians then necessarily build and rely on increasingly-
vast unelected bureaucracies to examine and decide policy
onmost meaningful questions requiring domain expertise.
This structure necessarily focuses tremendous pressures
on the representatives and the bureaucracies they oversee,
exposing them to strong incentives to corruption through
processes such as professional lobbying and regulatory
capture.
Ford’s proposal [29] addresses this tension between
topic specialization and representation by ensuring that
all voters can wield voting on all topics, and hence are
represented in decisions on those topics. Since most vot-
ers will not have time to follow most of those topics di-
rectly, they instead delegate their vote to a representa-
tive, analogous in principle to the tradition of delegating
choices to parties (Section 4), but with the greater free-
dom to delegate to microparties (Section 4.4) or individ-
22
uals (Section 4.6). Further, instead of having to choose
just one [micro]party or individual to represent them gen-
erally, voters could delegate decisions on different top-
ics to different representatives: e.g., delegating their vote
on healthcare decisions to a doctor or local medical ex-
pert they trust to represent their interests, and separately
delegating their vote on economy decisions to a local
economist or small-business owner whose opinion they
trust. If a voter’s immediate delegate cannot follow all
aspects (e.g., sub-topics) of the given topic directly ei-
ther, the delegate can transitively re-delegate decisions
on those sub-topics to other more-specialized experts on
those topics.
In a UseNet-like hierarchy of deliberative forums, each
active participant in a given topic would thus wield the ac-
cumulated power of all voters who delegated to them di-
rectly or indirectly, as in Alger’s proxy voting scheme [3].
Representatives could actually focus on and specialize in
particular topics rather than on the generic profession of
politics, accumulating considerable voting power in their
topics of specialty while remaining accountable to and
hence legitimately representative of all the voters who had
delegated to them. Since a representative who is widely-
recognized as a specialist in one topic (e.g., healthcare) is
unlikely to be similarly widely-recognized as a special-
ist in another (e.g., economy), the outsize influence of
these specialists on decisions in their focus topic should
not generally translate to outsize voting power on other
topics, thereby reducing the amount of generic power any
one representative has, and mitigating both the opportu-
nity and incentive for corrupting influences.
Scalability and Power Spreading from Topic Delega-
tion: To illustrate concretely how topic-specialized del-
egation could enable direct democracy to scale, suppose
for simplicity that an online liquid democracy forum is
organized into 1,000 unique topic-focused forums orga-
nized in a hierarchy consisting of ten top-level level 1
topics (health, economy, etc.), each of those subdivided
into ten level 2 subtopics (health insurance, etc.), and
each of those in turn subdivided into ten level 3 subtopics
(pre-existing conditions, etc.). Suppose that in a city of
100,000 voters, the “average” voter has time to follow
and deliberate directly in only one leaf-level subtopic or
group in this hierarchy. Assuming (unrealistically but also
unnecessarily) that the voters’ interests are relatively bal-
anced among topics, this implies that on average about
100 voters will follow and participate in each level 3
subtopic, with about 1000 voters following each level 2
subtopic, and about 10,000 voters following each level 1
topic. In order to be represented in all of the 999 level 3
sub-topics they can’t follow directly, each voter needs to
make at most nine delegation choices at each level: who to
delegate their vote to in the nine level 1 topics outside their
focus area, who to delegate their vote to in each of the nine
level 2 sub-topics outside their focus but within their level
1 focus area, and so on. Voters need not necessarily make
each of these nine choicse at each level separately, either:
providing their delegates have power to re-delegate tran-
sitively, many voters might simply delegate their voting
power outside their focus area to a “generic” delegate they
trust to choose specialty delegations for them.
In short, the total amount of decision-making effort de-
manded of each voter for “complete” participation and
representation in this fashion is logarithmic O(log n) in
the total number of topics n, and hence scalable to large
populations and topic hierarchies. Consider an even-
more-ambitious future in which a country of one billion
voters implemented such an online liquid democracy fo-
rum with a million (106) topics, subdivided by factors of
10 similar to the example above. Then if the average voter
directly follows and specializes in only one of the million
level 6 topics, there could be a healthy “parliament” of
about 1,000 participants in each, and each voter could still
be represented in each of the other 999,999 topics bymak-
ing at most 6× 9 delegation decisions. In practice, voters
seem likely to simplify their choice further by delegating
to the same semi-generic friend or colleague in several of
the sub-topics at a given level, perhaps making only one
generic delegation choice at one or more levels, thereby
delegating to their chosen generic representative the task
of deciding which specialists to delegate to on particu-
lar subtopics. Regardless of how fine- or coarse-grained
a voter’s delegation choices are, they are also likely to
keep many of these delegation choices “persistent” across
time and direct democracy election events, rather than re-
evaluating them before each new decision, amortizing the
decision costs of making even fairly complex delegation
choices.
Because each of these “average” voters may accumu-
late considerable delegated voting power in their specialty
but is unlikely to accumulate much delegated power far
from their specialty, the incentive and vulnerability to cor-
ruption among these specialized delegates may be many
orders of magnitude less than in a comparable society in
which (say) a single traditional parliament of 1,000 mem-
bers generically represented a million users each on all
policy matters in this billion-voter country. While each
representative of the generic parliament would wield one
million times the political power of an ordinary individ-
ual on all matters – a tremendous power concentration –
a specialized representative in each of the million liquid
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democracy topics would wield a million times the voting
power of a single individual but only on about one mil-
lionth of the issues being debated and decided, exercising
little to no delegated power in other specialties. Even ac-
counting for the fact that in practice we can expect bal-
ances of delegated voting power to be considerably less
even (e.g., outsize amounts of generic power perhaps go-
ing to some celebrities), nevertheless the spread of power
across a multitude of specialized topics seems likely to
result in far less concentration of power in general, and
hence perhaps susceptibility to corruption, than in a tradi-
tional representative government at large scale.
5.4 Scalable Choice at Varying Levels of
Specialization
We assumed above that online deliberation and demo-
cratic decision-making occur only at the bottommost leaf
levels of the topic hierarchy, but this constraint is proba-
bly neither strictly necessary nor desirable. Within each
low-level subtopic, issues are likely to arise that appear
particularly important or contentious, which may merit
pushing those issues “up the hierarchy” to less-specialized
subtopics or topics that more voters follow. For example,
a contentious policy decision on pre-existing conditions
for cancer patients might start in the corresponding low-
level subtopic but then “bubble upwards” to become an
initiative or referendum presented directly to, and inviting
debate and decision participation from, voters in higher-
level topics such as insurance policy or healthcare policy
in general.
Since issues that bubble up the topic hierarchy this way
demand the attention, enlightened understanding, and de-
cision capacity of progressively larger numbers of voters
(10× per level in our hypothetical examples above), we
must impose barriers or thresholds on this upward prop-
agation to ensure that each voter needs to examine and
decide on only a manageable few issues at each hierarchy
level in each time period. A few such issues each cycle
might capture particularly broad interest, surmounting the
highest thresholds, and as a result propgating all the way
up to the topmost level, where such issues are presented
to the entire voting population for consideration and de-
cision. Issues that propagate all the way to the top in this
way are thus precisely analogous to popular initiatives in
today’s working direct democracies such as Switzerland,
where only a few issues passing high signature thresholds
go onto the ballot that all voters see. Some issues are in-
deed important or of broad enough interest that it is worth
presenting them to the whole electorate – but since the
number of these necessarily must be limited, a topic hi-
erarchy with liquid delegation of choice could enable a
much larger number of direct democratic deliberations to
occur while preserving representativeness at all levels and
allowing each issue to “bubble up” to the level of special-
ization corresponding to the breadth of voting population
that considers the issue worthy and important enough for
consideration at that level.
5.5 Choice and Management of the Topic
Hierarchy
The above discussion has assumed that a suitable topic
hierarchy is somehow given, but the organization of this
hierarchy is of course another topic that would have to be
decided somehow. A simple approach would be to dele-
gate the task of tending this hierarchy to representatives
elected at large, e.g., a traditional parliament. While fea-
sible, this approach would present the risk that representa-
tives interested in their own re-election might be strongly
tempted to structure the topic hierarchy in favor of their
interests, in an analog of the real present-day problem of
gerrymandering. Does a low-level subtopic related to the
link between air quality and cancer belong under the topic
of Healthcare or Environment?
This choice matters, because the location of the
subtopic in the hierarchy will affect how voting power
gets delegated and hence distributed to direct participants
in that subtopic. An elected representative with strong
ties to the healthcare industry might benefit from tweak-
ing the hierarchy so that his healthcare-specialist friends
get as much delegated voting power as possible in deci-
sions on the subtopic, while a representative with stronger
ties to environmentalist groups might have the oppo-
site preference and fight to re-locate the subtopic under
Environment. While contention around such hierarchy-
management issues is probably unavoidable given the hu-
man judgment and subjective preferences ultimately in-
volved, it generally seems preferable if possible to avoid
hierarchy management becoming yet another political
football – like districting choicse – to incentivize and at-
tract corruptive tendencies.
A safer alternative, therefore, might for the electorate
at large to decide the manage hierarchy directly, using the
same proportional-representation tools we already com-
monly use for eleecting parliaments for example. Sup-
pose we stipulate by design that there shall be at most
ten top-level topics at level 1, ten level 2 subtopics under
each level 1 topic, etc. We might allow anyone to pro-
pose keywords they think should be level 1 topics, and pe-
riodically use a multi-winner proportional-representation
system such as STV, CTV, or QTV (Section 3) to “elect”
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proposed keywords (instead of human candidates) into the
10 available “positions” of level 1 topic status. The elec-
tion system’s proportionality measures ensure that the ten
chosen level 1 topics represent those of broadest interest
to the electorate at large, while ensuring that each voter’s
choice counts and as few votes as possible are “wasted.”
Once level 1 topics have been chosen this way, a simi-
lar multi-winner proportional election may be held within
each of these level 1 topics to its level 2 subtopics, and so
on. Since not every voter will likely be even aware of, let
alone interested in or knowledgable about, all of the de-
tailed topics at the lower levels of the hierarchy, enabling
users to delegate their power to specialists at these lower
levels will be just as important to setting up the lower lev-
els of the hierarchhy as to facilitating representative deci-
sions within them subsequently.
No single topic hierarchy, once chosen, will remain
“perfect” forever, of course, so processes for revising and
evolving the hierarchy will be just as essential. One sim-
ple approach is again to treat elections of keywords to
topic status much like electing candidates to parliamen-
tary seats: namely, ensure that each keyword’s status goes
“up for re-election” periodically (e.g., once every few
years), giving the electorate the opportunity to “promote”
topics to higher levels and to “demote” topics whose in-
terest has shrunk to lower, more specialized levels under-
neath other broader topics. A change in topic status at a
high level may need to trigger an automatic “re-election”
at lower levels containing related subtopics, to ensure that
deliberation and decisions that used to occur in a newly-
demoted topic have a suitable place to move to in the
lower levels of the hierarchy, for example.
5.6 Expressing Strength of Interest:
Quadratic Voting in Participation
Scalability
Given that the intended purpose of quadratic voting (QV)
is to enable and incentivize people to express their true
stength of preference in decision-making [64, 52], an ob-
vious question is whether QV could address the scalabil-
ity challenge to expanding direct democracy. Suppose,
for example, we lower the traditional barriers to getting
popular initiatives and referenda on the ballot, allowing
perhaps hundreds or thousands of questions onto the bal-
lot each cycle rather than just a few. Can we then just give
each voter an equal amount of virtual “coin” with which
to buy votes on the particular issues they care about, as
the QV theory suggests?
Deploying QV this way might be attractive from an
economic purist’s perspective, but could be profoundly
dangerous and counterproductive in practice, due to the
gap between the “perfectly rational voter” QV theory as-
sumes and the imperfect understanding of human voters.
As discussed earlier in Section 2.3, a realistic voter who
is unaware howmuch a moderately-subtle policy issue af-
fects him will “underspend” on that issue, perhaps invest-
ing nothing at all to vote either for or against many such
issues that he is not adequately informed about. Further-
more, the practice of distraction politics [45, 84, 55] could
deliberately draw voting power away from meaningful
but subtle issues toward “bright shiny objects” and sen-
sationalistic controversies, effectively handing most deci-
sion power on most special-interests to the special inter-
ests that care about them.
Quadratic voting therefore does not by itself address
the scalability problem that delegation in liquid democ-
racy addresses, although the two could potentially be used
in complementary ways. One obvious approach is to use
QTV (Section 3.5) to enable voters in choosing and main-
taining the topic hierarchy, as discussed above. In this
case, we use quadratic voting only to choose the (e.g.,
ten) topics of broadest interest to form the first-level top-
ics, and similarly using separate QTV instances within
each topic to choose up to ten sub-topics to flesh out the
hierarchy. It is much more reasonable to assume aver-
age voters are well-equipped to make reasonable judg-
ments on the ten broad policy topics of most importance
to them, than to make reasonable judgments on the im-
portance of – let alone actual decisions on – hundreds or
thousands of narrow specialized topics. Provided delega-
tion is permitted and in effect in the QTV instances that
decide on sub-topics of an already-specialized topic, we
have at least some hope that the bulk of voting power used
to decide those subtopics is by then (through delegation)
in the hands of people who are both specialized enough
to follow the topic in question, and representative of and
accountable to those whose voting power they wield.
Another way it might be useful and arguably “safe”
to use quadratic voting in this context is to allow users
to assign different levels of importance among a small
number of different “peer” topics or subtopics relative to
each other in the hierarchy, and adjust the user’s “vot-
ing weight” in each of those subtopics accordingly. Sup-
pose for example that the ten top-level topics include
Healthcare and Environment, and Alice cares much more
strongly about healthcare-related policy than about en-
vironmental policy. Instead of automatically giving her
equal voting power in both topics, as we normally would
expect by default, we might give her the option to divide
her voting power by parts and allow her to assign it ei-
ther evenly or unevenly to the topics using QV according
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to her judgment of their relative importance to her. For
example, if we considers Healthcare far more important
than Environment, she might assign four parts of her vot-
ing power to the former and only one to the latter, and
thereby wield a vote on Healthcare issues having 2× the
power as her vote on Environment issues. Within a partic-
ular lower-level topic she follows and is particularly inter-
ested in (e.g., health insurance policy), she might similarly
have an option to redistribute her voting power among the
subtopics (e.g., more to pre-existing conditions policy and
less to pediatrics insurance policy).
The critical point is that in this approach, she would
be using quadratic voting to redistribute her voting power
only among a small number of closely-related subtopics,
in one small local area of the hierarchy, where we can
plausibly expect the voter to have some genuine under-
standing of those subtopics and their “true” importance
to her relative to each other, givern that she is taking the
trouble to perform this redistribution at all. Thus, local
redistribution of voting weight using QV among a few al-
ternatives we have reason to expect the user to know about
may plausibly safe and valuable, whereas global redistri-
bution of voting weight among a large number of options
mostly unfamiliar to the voter would seem extremely dan-
gerous and fraught with risk.
6 Liquid Democracy and Time
In preparation.
7 Considerations for Systems Im-
plementing Liquid Democratic
Choice
In preparation.
8 Conclusion
In preparation.
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